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Introduction
Current issues in optimality theoretic syntax*
PETER ACKEMA AND HELEN DE HOOP
1. Introduction to OT syntax
General tendencies that hold in or across languages are easy to ﬁnd. For
example, sentences in English usually have a subject. The subject often is
the ﬁrst element in the sentence. In many cases, the subject is the agent of
the action expressed by the verb. Crucially, these statements are mere ten-
dencies, not absolute laws. It is very di‰cult to ﬁnd observable properties
that hold without exception across languages. If we were to formulate
these general statements as rules, these rules would often have to be bro-
ken because of a number of exceptions. In standard generative syntax,
constraints are assumed to be inviolable, i.e., they must be satisﬁed in a
grammatical sentence. In order to ‘‘save’’ generalizations (rules) from ap-
parent violations (counterexamples) in the linguistic data, generally three
strategies are applied:
1. assume empty structure to satisfy the constraint (invisibly);
2. assume an abstract level at which the constraint is satisﬁed
(invisibly);
3. modify the constraint, making it less general, so that it is satisﬁed
by the data.
In Optimality Theory (OT), grammatical constraints are also assumed to
be universal, but crucially, they may be violated in order to satisfy other,
‘‘stronger’’, constraints. Thus, in OT general statements take the form of
violable constraints. Because these constraints express very general state-
ments with respect to language, they are often in conﬂict. Conﬂicts among
constraints are resolved because the constraints di¤er in strength. The
constraints can be ordered in a constraint hierarchy according to strength.
In OT, the output (the grammatical structure) is determined through op-
timization over a ranked set of constraints.
Initially applied to phonology, OT has proved to be a fruitful tool of
analysis in syntax (and semantics) as well. Although the ﬁeld is too young
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to be able to speak of a ‘‘standard’’ model of OT syntax, there are a num-
ber of assumptions that play a role in much of the core work, such as the
following:
A. The competitors in a constraint evaluation procedure are (syn-
tactic or phonological) representations, rather than derivations.
Therefore, OT is more compatible with representational models
of grammar than with derivational models.
B. Crosslinguistic variation is the result of constraint reranking. In
principle, any constraint ranking corresponds to a possible gram-
mar (although di¤erent constraint rankings can result in identical
grammatical patterns); there are no ﬁxed rankings.
C. There is a strict separation between the evaluation of syntactic
representations on the basis of a hierarchy of syntactic constraints
and the evaluation of phonological representations on the basis of
a hierarchy of phonological constraints. There is no ‘‘mixing’’ of
constraints that pertain to di¤erent modules of grammar.
D. Related to this, syntactic evaluation is also separated from seman-
tic evaluation. Semantic identity is the deﬁning criterion in deter-
mining which syntactic representations are in competition with one
another. Whether or not this semantics is the optimal one for all
the syntactic representations involved plays no role.
E. The constraint ranking is absolute, in the sense that, in case of
conﬂict, higher constraints always take priority over lower ones.
If two representations di¤er in their violation of a higher con-
straint, the one that violates this constraint least blocks the other
one. No number of violations of a lower constraint or a combina-
tion of violations of more than one lower constraint can alter this.
All these assumptions have been the subject of debate, and the papers in
this special issue all contain challenges in some form or another to one
or more of them. In some cases, the authors argue that the core of an
assumption is correct, but that new data require a modiﬁcation of the
theory. In other cases, it is argued that a particular assumption should
be abandoned altogether. In this introduction, we will give a brief over-
view of the issues discussed in the various contributions and how they re-
late to these general theoretical assumptions.
2. Representational models versus derivational models
Traditional generative syntax contains a mix of derivations and represen-
tations. Syntax consists of a number of derivational steps, which link one
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level of representation to the next (D-structure — S-structure — LF and
PF). There are conditions on what legitimate derivations are (restrictions
on movement such as island conditions and the cycle) and conditions on
what proper representations are (such as the theta criterion and the that-
trace ﬁlter). Various authors have argued that a more parsimonious theory
does not have this mixed nature, and that all syntactic constraints should
be recast either as restrictions on derivations (e.g., Epstein et al. 1998), or,
on the contrary, as well-formedness conditions on a single level of syntac-
tic representation (e.g., Brody 1995).
At ﬁrst sight, it may seem that models adopting an OT-style interaction
between conﬂicting constraints ﬁt more naturally into a representational
model. The constraints in OT are usually taken to say something about
the wellformedness of representations, so it is di¤erent representations
that compete for grammaticality. Note, however, that this as such does
not say anything about how these representations are built — this may
be via a series of derivational steps just as well as via a one-step represen-
tational mechanism. In fact, many models of OT syntax assume that there
is a derivational generator, subject to inviolable principles, that produces
representations that are then subject to the OT-style evaluation of viola-
ble constraints (cf. Grimshaw 1997; Mu¨ller 1997; Ackema and Neeleman
1998; Broekhuis and Dekkers 1998). If we allow for derivations, we may
also allow the possibility that the violable constraints say something about
these derivations, and compare derivations rather than representations.
This issue is addressed in Silke Fischer’s paper. She integrates binding
theory — which belongs to the core of the standard generative syntactic
enterprise — into a derivational OT syntactic framework. The approach
she develops can account for crosslinguistic variation by restricted con-
straint reranking as well as for optionality, which is argued to follow
from tied constraints. Binding theory is quite interesting from the point
of view of the representational — derivational debate. If we opt for a
derivational theory, we should try to avoid any appeal to the relevance of
representations in the form of constraints that say something about the
overall wellformedness of the derived structures, otherwise we still have
a mixed theory. The derivational constraints must therefore be extremely
local — they can only allow or prohibit single derivational steps. At least
at ﬁrst sight, binding appears to be a typically nonlocal relation. The
antecedent of a pronoun, in particular, can be quite far away from that
pronoun.
Fischer argues that an anaphoric element introduces a ‘‘realization ma-
trix’’ in the derivation, which gets transported up the tree in each step of a
derivation. She introduces a family of constraints that have the e¤ect that,
when certain phrases (acting as particular binding domains) are passed in
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the derivation, some realization options for the anaphoric element are de-
leted from this matrix. When the antecedent is introduced in the deriva-
tion, the shape of the anaphoric element is determined by another con-
straint that forces this element to receive the most anaphoric realization
allowed by the current realization matrix. The account makes crucial
use of the OT-device of competition between conﬂicting constraints, but
within a derivational model. On the one hand, there is the general con-
straint that says that anaphoric elements should be realized as anaphori-
cally as possible (where a self-anaphor is more anaphoric than a simplex
anaphor, which in turn is more anaphoric than a pronoun). On the other
hand, there is the equivalent of principle A: if no antecedent is found
within a particular domain, the anaphoric element must not be maximally
anaphoric. The latter is in fact a family of constraints, one per possible
binding domain (cf. Wexler and Manzini 1987 on the idea that binding
domains come in di¤erent sizes).
Reranking the relevant constraints accounts for language variation with
respect to where self-anaphors are allowed, where simplex anaphors are
allowed, and in which domains we see pronouns. At the same time, the
family of principle-A-like constraints is ranked in accordance with a uni-
versal subhierachy. After all, in all languages it is the case that the larger
the domain without an antecedent, the more important it is that we do not
get realization as an anaphor, so the constraints that regulate this should
not be rerankable. It is the boundaries between the domains where we see
the di¤erent realizations (anaphor or pronoun) that di¤er from language
to language.
Interestingly, whereas many representational versions of OT have been
argued to show a ‘‘derivational residue’’ (cf. Hermans and van Oosten-
dorp 2000), Fischer acknowledges that within this radically derivational
OT model there is what may be called a ‘‘representational residue’’. This
is because at the point of the derivation where the realization matrix
reaches the domain in which the antecedent can be found, this matrix de-
termines the realization of an element that is positioned in a lower do-
main, sometimes in a much lower domain.
3. Crosslinguistic variation and universal hierarchies
We noted that in Fischer’s paper, there is a family of constraints whose
mutual ranking is universally ﬁxed, which interacts with other, freely re-
rankable, constraints. The possibility that there are such universal mark-
edness subhierarchies was already proposed in the earliest work on OT
(Prince and Smolensky 2004), also in OT syntax (e.g., Bakovic 1998).
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Interestingly, whereas the papers in this issue range over a large variety of
syntactic topics, many of them deal with the question of how to accom-
modate universal tendencies within crosslinguistic variation, and argue
for the existence of some ﬁxed constraint subhierarchy within a larger sys-
tem of rerankable constraints.
In an inﬂuential series of papers on di¤erential case marking, Aissen
(1999, 2003) has proposed a number of such markedness constraint sub-
hierarchies, based on person/number/animacy hierarchies such as that of
Silverstein (1976). Aissen proposes these constraint families in order to
deal with the universal tendency that ‘‘marked’’ subjects and ‘‘marked’’
objects can be marked di¤erently for case (and/or agreement) than ‘‘un-
marked’’ ones. The interaction of the families of markedness constraints
with other, rerankable, constraints accounts for crosslinguistic variation
in where the boundaries between what counts as a ‘‘marked’’ subject or
object and what counts as an ‘‘unmarked’’ one are drawn. Two papers
in this issue (Trommer and Brown) refer directly to the constraints and
constraint hierarchies proposed by Aissen, arguing that they need to be
modiﬁed for di¤erent reasons. However, the idea that the tension between
crosslinguistic variation and universal tendencies can be properly ac-
counted for by the interaction of rerankable constraints with families of
markedness constraints whose internal ranking is universal can be applied
to di¤erent domains of syntax and morphology than to case/agreement
systems, as we will now discuss ﬁrst.
Linguistics is the study of language (as a cognitive faculty) and the
study of languages (as particular realizations of the language faculty).
Within the ﬁeld of linguistics, there is always a tension between the search
for uniﬁcation (‘‘universal grammar’’) and the empirical diversity of lan-
guage phenomena. In OT, variation among languages follows from dif-
ferences in constraint rankings. Typological analyses, especially those
dealing with ‘‘competing motivations’’, are perfectly compatible with
OT. Andrej Malchukov recasts the driving forces behind transcategorical
operations, in particular nominalizations, in an OT framework. In nomi-
nalizations, morphosyntactic properties arise from the interaction of (con-
ﬂicting) constraints, some of which are functional, some structural. Func-
tionally based hierarchies of nominal and verbal categories interfere with
structural factors such as morpheme order and category cumulation.
Malchukov argues that deverbal nominalization consists of both ‘‘dec-
ategorization’’ and ‘‘recategorization’’. This means the loss of verbal
properties and the acquisition of nominal properties are seen as two sepa-
rate processes, which are both involved in cases of nominalization. In
both processes, a universal hierarchy plays a crucial role. One of these ex-
presses which verbal properties will be lost ﬁrst, and in which order other
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verbal properties will be lost. The other hierarchy expresses which nomi-
nal properties will be acquired ﬁrst and the order in which other nominal
properties are acquired.
Malchukov proposes that there are two general constraints of the
‘‘faithfulness’’ type that determine how nominal or verbal a nominaliza-
tion will be. The ﬁrst, FuncFaith, links the discourse function of a phrase
to its lexical category: a phrase that expresses an event is preferably ex-
pressed by a verbal category, whereas a phrase that can express a partici-
pant in an event is preferably expressed by a nominal catgory. So a nom-
inalization that expresses a participant is preferably nominal. Opposing
this is the constraint LexFaith, which demands that the lexical category
of a phrase is determined by the semantic class of the root of its head.
Since the root in a nominalization is of the semantic class ‘‘event’’, a
nominalization should be verbal according to this constraint. Such gen-
eral constraints can be split into a family of constraints, based on the
universal hierarchies of decategorization and recategorization mentioned
above. The mutual ranking of all these constraints then determines how
nominal or verbal a nominalization in a particular language is.
Note that in this type of analysis the ‘‘decategorization’’ (losing verbal
properties) aspect of nominalziation and the ‘‘recategorization’’ (acquir-
ing nominal properties) aspect are really independent. In Malchukov’s
model, the various degrees to which decategorization takes place in nom-
inalizations crosslinguistically are the result of gradually demoting Lex-
Faith constraints (‘‘be verbal if your root has the semantics of a verb’’)
along the universal FuncFaith constraint subhierarchy (‘‘don’t have illo-
cutionary force if you function as a participant’’ > ‘‘don’t have subject
agreement if you function as a participant’’ > ‘‘don’t have Mood if you
function as a participant’’, etc.). The various degrees to which recategori-
zation takes place crosslinguistically result from demotion of LexFaith
constraints along a FuncFaith hierarchy that now mentions ‘‘do have
nominal characteristics if you function as participant’’ (‘‘don’t lack case
if you function as a participant’’ > ‘‘don’t lack a determiner if you func-
tion as a participant’’, etcetera). Since the FuncFaith constraints that pre-
clude verbal characteristics for a participant do not directly interact with
the FuncFaith constraints that demand nominal characteristics, it is pos-
sible in principle that many verbal qualities are lost (if most verbal Func-
Faith constraints outrank LexFaith), without low-level nominal proper-
ties being acquired (if only the highest nominal FuncFaith constraints
outrank LexFaith). This is an interesting di¤erence with the idea that
nominalization results from a ‘‘switch’’ in the functional structure above
a category (e.g., Marantz 1997). The latter usually implies that, when
we ‘‘switch’’ from verbal to nominal, all nominal functional structure is
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present above the point where verbal functional structure is lost. An im-
portant question therefore is whether nominalizations can lack certain
functional elements altogether, instead of showing either a nominal or a
verbal functional element at a particular level of the structure.
In general, Malchukov’s paper illustrates again the important role of
universal constraint subhierarchies, within a larger set of rerankable con-
ﬂicting constraints, in giving a proper account of certain types of crosslin-
guistic variation (in this case how nominal or verbal nominalizations are)
that are subject to universal characteristics (in this case of the type ‘‘if
nominal property A is acquired then so is nominal property B’’ and ‘‘if
verbal property A is lost then so is verbal property B’’). (Of course, there
can also be language-internal variation in how nominal or verbal a nom-
inalization is — compare, for example, the English nominal and verbal
gerunds. How to deal with such variation is a di¤erent matter).
Let us now turn to the papers, already brieﬂy mentioned above, that
deal with Aissen’s (1999, 2003) analysis of di¤erential case marking.
Sometimes, not all subjects (or objects) of transitive clauses are case
marked, but only those phrases that are ‘‘less typical’’ as a subject (or as
an object). A functional explanation for this is that overtly marking a less
typical subject with ‘‘subjective case marking’’ or a less typical object with
‘‘objective case marking’’ helps to tag the grammatical function of one ar-
gument with respect to the other, and so to ease the parsing of the sen-
tence (cf. Silverstein 1976; Comrie 1989). Two papers in this special issue
test Aissen’s framework against evidence from lesser studied languages.
In a number of genetically unrelated languages, agreement is not tied
to the roles of subject or object, but rather to the argument which ranks
higher in a prominence hierarchy. Jochen Trommer investigates person
and number agreement in Dumi (spoken in Eastern Nepal). At ﬁrst sight,
the agreement system in Dumi appears to be of the type just mentioned.
Usually, the two arguments in a transitive sentence compete for the status
of controller of a single agreement slot on the verb, and it is the argument
that ranks highest on the prominence hierarchy that determines the form
of agreement marker. The ﬁrst complication is that two di¤erent hierar-
chies play a role: a person hierarchy ð1 > 2 > 3Þ and a number hierarchy
(plural > dual > singular). It is possible that the argument that is highest
in one hierarchy is lowest in the other one. This can still be dealt with in
a system like Aissen’s, by adding number markedness constraints to the
person markedness constraints and having these compete in the usual OT
fashion. However, Trommer shows that there is a phenomenon in Dumi
that makes a more radical modiﬁcation of Aissen’s model necessary. For a
particular combination of person and number on subject and object, there
suddenly is agreement with both on the verb, rather than competition for
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a single agreement slot. Trommer argues that this cannot be captured by
Aissen’s model, in which there is a ﬁxed hierarchy of markedness con-
straints that interact with a general ‘‘don’t have structure’’ (so don’t have
agreement or case) constraint. Trommer argues that constraints must be
‘‘binary’’ instead, in the sense that each constraint that determines
whether a feature demands marking by agreement refers to features in
the context of other features. So there are di¤erent constraints for, say,
second person subjects in the context of a ﬁrst person object and second
person subjects in the context of a third person object. The correct results
then follow from ranking such constraints with respect to the general con-
straint that excludes double agreement (akin to the ‘‘don’t have structure’’
constraint).
Interestingly, Trommer argues that, given this ‘‘binary’’ nature of the
relevant constraints, there is no longer a need to assume a ﬁxed, universal,
subhierarchy of the markedness constraints. The constraints can be freely
reranked with respect to each other, all rankings resulting in a potentially
possible grammar. The universal feature hierarchies are instead built into
the deﬁnition of the constraints themselves.
It might in fact be possible to extend Aissen’s model in a natural way
to accommodate the type of interaction between subject and object fea-
tures discussed by Trommer. This is because Trommer’s binary con-
straints may be translatable into conjunctions of constraints of Aissen’s
type. In fact, most of Aissen’s constraints are themselves derived by con-
straint conjunction. Case marking in Aissen’s system is determined by
conjoined constraints of the general type ‘‘do not have a caseless subject
and do not have a subject with feature F’’ (where F is 1st person, 2nd per-
son, . . .). The conjoined constraint penalizes a caseless subject with partic-
ular features. Crucially, these conjoined constraints can be ranked in a
di¤erent position with respect to a general ‘‘don’t have case’’ (or, in
Trommer’s case, agreement) constraint than the single constraints they
are derived from. Now, to account for certain ergative case patterns, in
which the subject of a transitive clause is case marked, but a subject with
the same features in an intransitive clause is not, Aissen argues that we
need another instance of constraint conjunction (cf. also Brown’s paper,
this issue): we must conjoin the constraints that want a subject with par-
ticular features to be case marked with a constraint *Obj/Person that
simply says ‘‘don’t have an object (with any person features)’’. Again,
these conjoined constraints can be ranked di¤erently with respect to the
‘‘no structure’’ (no case or agreement) constraint than the constraints
they are derived from. Thus, a ranking (*Caseless-subject & *Sub/3 &
*Obj/Person) > NoCase > (*Caseless-subject & *Sub/3) results in case
on 3rd person subjects in transitive clauses but not in intransitive clauses.
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If we split *Obj/Person into the constraint family *Obj/3, *Obj/2 and
*Obj/1 and allow for these to be conjoined with the constraint family
pertaining to subject case and object case we derive constraints much
like Trommer’s (as we would get constraints like ‘‘do not have a caseless
2nd person subject if there is a 3d person object’’, ‘‘do not have a caseless
1st person object if there is a second person subject’’, and so on), and
these can all be ranked di¤erently with respect to the ‘‘no structure con-
straint’’, as required by the Dumi data.
The e¤ect the presence of an object can have on the case marking of
the subject is also addressed in J. C. Brown’s paper. Brown tests Aissen’s
typology of constraint rankings against ‘‘quasi object constructions’’ in
Halkomelem (spoken in British Columbia, Canada). He argues that Ais-
sen’s constraints pertaining to case marking in transitive constructions, in
particular the conjoined constraints mentioned above that penalize non-
case-marked subjects (with particular features) in the presence of an ob-
ject, cannot deal with constructions in which there is a ‘‘restricted’’ object.
These constructions behave like intransitives, in particular with respect to
the case marking on the subject, but nevertheless they do contain what
appears to be a genuine object. (They have been analysed as antipassives,
in which the apparent object is really an oblique adjunct, but Brown puts
forward a number of arguments against such an analysis). Brown’s so-
lution is to make a distinction between two di¤erent types of objects.
Based on an LFG-style classiﬁcation of arguments in terms of the fea-
tures [þ/restricted] and [þ/object], Brown argues that the object
in a ‘‘quasi-object construction’’ di¤ers from other objects in being
[þrestricted] (it is indeed restricted in the semantic properties it can
have). The relevant constraints can then be made sensitive to whether or
not an object has the [þrestricted] feature or not. This means the di¤erent
case marking in transitives versus intransitives can be dealt with in the
same way that Aissen does, but with di¤erent constraints ‘‘don’t have an
object in addition to a caseless subject’’ and ‘‘don’t have a restricted ob-
ject in addition to a caseless subject’’, with the latter ranked below the
former (and the former not pertaining to restricted objects) and the ‘‘no
case’’ constraint in between. The core features of Aissen’s model are thus
preserved, although it has to be extended with a construction-speciﬁc type
of constraint.
4. Cross-modular OT and word-order phenomena
In English, sentences tend to display the basic word order subject-verb-
object, but when there is a wh-expression present in a wh-question, this
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activates a constraint that is even stronger than the constraint that deter-
mines canonical word order. This greater force requires wh-words such as
what to appear in sentence initial position. These data can be explained
adequately by the competition among violable constraints in an OT
framework (see e.g., Ackema and Neeleman 1998). In this example, we
may argue that basically two syntactic constraints are in conﬂict, one that
preserves canonical word order (Grimshaw 1997), and one (or two) that
trigger wh-movement. The trigger for wh-fronting presumably has a se-
mantic motivation (overt marking of the scope of the wh-phrase and/or
overt marking of the illocutionary force of a sentence). This brings up
the question how OT should deal with ‘‘interface’’ phenomena: linguistic
phenomena and processes that are the result of the interaction among dif-
ferent linguistic modules (Blutner et al. 2006). Assuming that grammar is
modular, the question is whether we should assume there are separate hi-
erarchies of constraints that pertain to di¤erent modules, with a serial
evaluation procedure in which the output from one module is taken as
input to the evaluation procedure in the next module. Or should we allow
some amount of ‘‘mixing’’ of constraints from di¤erent modules, and have
a single evaluation procedure at the interface that looks at representations
from di¤erent modules in parallel? Two articles in this issue (Vogel and
Zeevat) focus on this type of interaction between di¤erent modules of
grammar.
Ralf Vogel discusses weak function word shift in the Mainland Scan-
dinavian languages. This phenomenon has been argued to have a pro-
sodic motivation (there should not be prosodically weak elements at
the right edge of a phonological phrase; Selkirk 1996), but it is also
subject to some syntactic constraints (most famously, Holmberg’s gen-
eralization, which says that the underlying order between shifted ele-
ment and main verb should be preserved). Vogel argues that neither a
purely phonological account nor a purely semantic-syntactic account
can adequately describe the phenomenon. Vogel’s approach is instead
to allow for direct interaction between prosodic constraints and syntac-
tic constraints, where prosodic constraints are argued to be in between
syntactic constraints of varying strength in the cross-modular hierarchy
of constraints. In this OT model of the syntax-phonology interaction,
the input to the evaluation procedure is a syntactic structure, whereas
the output is a correspondence between the syntactic structure and a
prosodic structure. In this way, typical ‘‘correspondence’’ constraints
of the type ‘‘align a (right) edge of a particular syntactic phrase with
the (right) edge of a particular phonological phrase’’ can interact
with constraints that determine the wellformedness of the syntactic
structures.
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5. Bidirectionality
Obviously, not every syntactic structure should compete with every other
syntactic structure in OT syntax. There must be restrictions on what is
the so-called ‘‘candidate set’’ in an evaluation process. One of the de-
ﬁning factors that determine whether two structures are in competition
or not has been taken to be a semantic one: they must have the same
semantics. (In other syntactic models that allow for competition be-
tween derivations and/or representations, this is also usually taken to
be the criterion that determines whether two derivations/representations
compete).
If this is correct, it predicts that a sentence with interpretation A can
never block a sentence with a di¤erent interpretation B. But precisely
that seems to happen in cases of freezing, the phenomenon at the centre
of Henk Zeevat’s contribution. Freezing is said to occur when in the ab-
sence of disambiguating morphological or syntactic clues, variation in
word order is not allowed. Hence, canonical word order determines the
optimal interpretation as long as it is not overruled by other, stronger
constraints on interpretation such as case marking. For example, in the
V2 language Dutch in principle any constituent can be fronted to the ﬁrst
position, in front of the ﬁnite verb in the V2 position — including the ob-
ject. This means that, in Dutch, a sentence like Jan slaat Piet ‘Jan hits
Piet’ is in principle ambiguous: Jan could be the subject or the fronted ob-
ject, and Piet could be the object or the inverted subject. But in actual
fact this sentence is interpreted such that Jan is the subject (the agent of
‘hit’) and Piet is the object (the patient of ‘hit’). Apparently, the sentence
with the ‘‘Jan is agent’’ interpretation blocks the sentence with the ‘‘Jan is
preposed patient’’ interpretation (at least when both are pronounced with
identical intonation). In the V2 languages where it is possible to unambig-
uously distinguish the object from the subject on the basis of their mor-
phological case marking, on the other hand, the e¤ect disappears, and
an OVS sentence is just as allowable as an SVO one.
It has been proposed that this is an e¤ect of an evaluation procedure
‘‘in the other direction’’, from syntax to semantics. A sentence is optimal
not just if its structure is the optimal one for a particular interpretation; in
addition, its interpretation must be the optimal one for its structure. The
interpretation of Jan slaat Piet in which Jan is a preposed topic is subop-
timal compared to the interpretation it has with canonical subject-verb-
object order, and hence loses out. Since optimality therefore seems to de-
pend simultaneously on syntactic evaluation and semantic evaluation, it
has been proposed that we have to allow for ‘‘bidirectional’’ evalua-
tions, that is, simultaneous evaluations of pairs of syntactic and semantic
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structures and the correspondences between them (compare this with Vo-
gel’s proposal to evaluate pairs of syntactic and phonological representa-
tions and the correspondences between them simultaneously). Zeevat
notes, however, that there are several problems with a truly bidirectional
model, and adheres to a monodirectional syntactic OT model, in which
just the syntactic structures compete with each other. He proposes instead
that the ‘‘bidirectional’’ aspect needed to deal with freezing should be built
into some of the constraints that evaluate the syntactic representations. In
particular, Zeevat argues that that there must be a ‘‘marking’’ type of
constraint family. Such marking constraints state that a syntactic struc-
ture is penalized if a particular aspect of interpretation, such as the distri-
bution of theta roles across its arguments, or information what the topic
of the sentence is, is not unambiguously encoded by it. These con-
straints then interact with constraints that purely deal with syntactic
well-formedness (such as the ‘‘wh-phrase ﬁrst’’ constraint) in regular OT-
syntactic fashion.
6. Cumulativity
Optimality theory has its source in connectionism, or parallel distributed
processing, a view on cognition that emerged in the 1980s as an alterna-
tive to what is nowadays known as the classical or symbolic view. Mental
representations are either conceived of as a kind of symbolic structures
(language of thought) or as connectionist patterns of activation. Connec-
tionist models are neurally inspired, computation on such a system can
be called ‘‘brain-style’’ computation. Basically, a connectionist approach
takes something like an abstract neuron as its processing unit and compu-
tation is carried out through simple interactions among such units. The
idea is that these processing units communicate by sending numbers
along the lines that connect them.
From many corners it has been doubted that a connectionist model can
handle complex cognitive processes such as language processing. Smolen-
sky and Legendre (2006) argue, however, that connectionist principles are
in fact essential to account for certain fundamental properties of language
and grammar. Optimality theory has become a popular trend in linguis-
tics after its introduction in 1993 by Alan Prince and Paul Smolensky
(Prince and Smolensky 2004). The most revolutionary innovation in OT
was the fact that the constraints are soft, which means that an output can
still be grammatical if constraints are violated. Violations have to be min-
imal, however, such that a constraint may be violated, but only in order
to satisfy a higher ranked constraint. The fact that the well-formedness
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constraints in OT are soft and potentially conﬂicting is a direct conse-
quence of principles of connectionist computation.
In OT as well as in its predecessor harmonic grammar, the linguistic
notion of well-formedness and a connectionist notion of well-formedness
or harmony are brought together. The harmony of an activation pattern
is a number that measures the degree to which the pattern is well-formed
according to the connections in the network (see Figure 1).
A connection between two units can be interpreted as a constraint: e.g.,
if a is active, then b should not be active, or if g is active, then b should be
active. Thus, b can be subject to conﬂicting constraints. The prediction is
then that the strongest constraint will win. This means that the network
settles at an activation pattern that has maximal harmony with respect
to its connections. Note that harmonic grammar as a numerical theory
that centers around the concept of harmony, crucially di¤ers from its
nonnumerical counterpart optimality theory, a theory that deals with
strict dominance hierarchies of constraints instead of weight values. In
optimality theory no number of weaker constraints can override a stron-
ger constraint. In harmonic grammar, on the other hand, two weaker
constraints combined can override one stronger constraint. Also, the de-
gree of activation of the constraints matters. If two constraints compete
and one is weaker than the other but activated to a higher degree, this
one can still win.
Whether the OT perspective of strict domination of constraints is to be
preferred over harmonic grammar is still an open issue, as far as we are
concerned. The shift from harmonic grammar to optimality theory was
mainly empirically motivated by data found in the domain of phonology,
while the only application of Harmonic Grammar was situated in the do-
main of syntax and semantics (Smolensky and Legendre 2006).
Gerhard Ja¨ger and Anette Rosenbach explicitly argue against the stan-
dard OT view on the basis of clear cumulativity e¤ects found in the
grammatical variation of genitive constructions in English. Cumulativity
can come in two types. There can be ‘‘ganging-up’’ cumulativity, which
means that violations of a combination of lower constraints can together
override violation of a higher constraint, and there can be ‘‘counting’’
Figure 1. A connectionist network
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cumulativity, which means more violations of a lower constraint can over-
ride a violation of a higher constraint. Ja¨ger and Rosenbach argue that
the data concerning the choice between possessive -s or of-construction
in English possessives show both types of cumulativity e¤ect. They draw
the conclusion that probabilistic harmonic grammars do a better job in
modelling grammatical variation in syntax and semantics than a proba-
bilistic version of standard OT.
University of Edinburgh
Radboud University Nijmegen
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